Introduction
While open-source and proprietary platforms have coexisted since the early days of the computing industry, competition between these two modes of development has intensified dramatically following the surge of the Internet in the mid-1990s. Proprietary development, on the other hand, has closed access and closed investment: the platform owner sets access prices and invests centrally to improve its quality. The coexistence of these two diametrically opposed modes of platform governance has sparked a thriving literature on open source examining why individuals and profit-maximizing firms might choose to contribute to open-source development (see Lerner and Tirole, 2005; von Krogh and von Hippel, 2006; Fershtman and Gandal, 2011 , for recent surveys).
While insightful and enlightening, theoretical developments on the economics of open source have fallen short of fully embracing the modeling breakthroughs offered by the literature on two-sided platforms of the past decade (e.g., Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006; Armstrong, 2006; Hagiu, 2006a; Spulber, 2006; Weyl, 2010) . Likewise, while the literature on two-sided platforms has studied some aspects of open platforms, the most distinctive feature of open source (i.e., open investment) has not been considered.
In this paper, we bring together these two streams of work to address the following questions: (i) How are the incentives to invest in platform quality affected by the degree of platform openness? (ii) What is the relation between access and investment strategies? and (iii) How are access prices and incentives to invest in platform quality moderated by competition between open-source and proprietary two-sided platforms?
We set up a model of a platform that brings together users and developers of applications. Users are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for access to the platform. Developers are heterogeneous in that they bear different costs for developing applications. A proprietary platform chooses how much to invest in platform quality and sets access prices for each side of the market. An open platform may be accessed for free and developers may invest in improving its quality.
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After users and developers have accessed the platform, developers compete to sell applications to users. Users prefer product variety but consider applications as interchangeable. Along with the case of substitute applications whose marginal value decreases with the number of applications available, we study the mirror case of complement applications.
We divide the analysis into two parts. First, we examine models of proprietary and open monopoly platforms; that is, we consider incentives to invest in proprietary and open platforms in isolation from each other and compare equilibrium outcomes. In the second part, we study a mixed-duopoly model with direct competition between both types of platforms. Third, opening one side of a proprietary platform may lower incentives to invest in platform quality. A closed platform sets access prices to internalize indirect network effects. This allows the platform to capture the entire variation in utility resulting from larger investment. Internalizing network effects is not possible when one of the sides has free access. In this case, the platform captures less of the investment's contribution to consumer utility. As a result, investment incentives are weaker. Lower investment, in turn, may lead to lower levels of adoption by users and developers. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we explain how our paper relates with the extant literature. In Section 2, we present the model. In Section 3, we study and compare monopoly proprietary and open platforms. In Section 4, we study a hybrid model with open access and closed investment. In Section 5, we study a mixed duopoly model in which a proprietary platform and an open platform compete for users. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
1.1. Related literature. Our paper contributes to the literature on multisided markets and on the economics of open source. A large share of the extant literature on two-sided platforms studies pricing in the presence of network effects (e.g., Spulber, 1996; Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006; Armstrong, 2006; Hagiu, 2006a; Nocke, Peitz, and Stahl, 2007; Casadesus-Masanell and Ruiz-Aliseda, 2008; Weyl, 2010) . In general terms, the structure of equilibrium prices depends on the relative size of demand elasticities and cross-group externalities, the costs of serving each side of the market, market structure, and whether end-users single-home or multi-home. Although we focus on the incentives to invest in platform quality, we also derive the access prices charged by proprietary platforms in equilibrium and obtain results congruous with the literature. Closer to our setting, Hagiu (2006b) and Economides and Katsamakas (2006b) Belleflamme and Peitz (2010) , Zhao (2010) , and Lin, Li, and Whinston (2011) study sellers' incentives to invest in the quality of the products they sell, rather than on the quality of the platform. Our work is closer to Economides and Katsamakas (2006a) Rather than one-sided operating systems, we consider two-sided platforms. In our setting, the proprietary platform chooses access prices for two sides and may subsidize one side in order to better exploit indirect network effects. Moreover, we allow for endogenous platform adoption by users and developers and, contrary to Economides and Katsamakas (2006a) (Lerner and Tirole, 2005; von Krogh and von Hippel, 2006; Fershtman and Gandal, 2011, present excellent surveys) . The most common explanations were altruism, personal gratification, peer recognition, and career concerns. We do not consider social preferences or career concerns. Rather, we focus on self-interested agents and examine the value of investments in the platform to the very developers who make those investments.
Our paper also contributes to an emerging literature in strategy that explores competitive interactions between organizations with different business models.
While several formal models of asymmetric competition exist in strategy (mainly, differences in costs, resource endowments, or information), the asymmetries that (Mustonen, 2003; Bitzer, 2004; Gaudeul, 2005; Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat, 2006; Economides and Katsamakas, 2006b; Lee and Mendelson, 2008; Casadesus-Masanell and Llanes, 2011) . These papers, however, assume that investment incentives are exogenously given (generally, investment in open source is a function of the number of users).
The exception is Llanes and de Elejalde (2013) , who assume that investment is performed by sellers of complementary goods. In addition, for the most part, the literature on mixed duopoly presents models of one-sided firms. We contribute work in this area by endogenizing developer's investment incentives and by considering interactions between different types of two-sided platforms.
The model
We study a two-sided monopoly platform that brings together application developers and users.
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The platform may be software (e.g., an operating system), hardware (e.g., a DVD player), or a combination of the two (e.g., a video game console). We focus on the incentives to invest in platform quality, that is, on the incentives to develop the software or hardware that constitutes the platform. Although the number of applications is endogenous in our model, we do not study incentives to invest in application quality, which have been studied elsewhere (Hagiu, 2007; Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010; Zhao, 2010; Lin, Li, and Whinston, 2011 ).
There is a continuum of potential users, i ∈ [0, ∞), and developers, j ∈ [0, ∞).
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Users demand applications and run them on the platform. The indirect utility of
where n is the measure of available applications, x is the investment in platform quality, v(n, x) is the gross utility of consuming n applications when the platform has received investment x, h(i) is a user-specific adoption cost, p u is the platform access price for users, and ρ(j) is the price of application j.
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We follow the usual convention of representing partial derivatives through sub-
, and assume that all functions are three times continuously differentiable.
Users prefer higher quality platforms and application variety, v x > 0 and v n > 0.
The investment in platform quality and the measure of applications are complements, v nx ≥ 0. If v nn = 0, applications are independent in that consuming more of any one application does not affect the marginal utility of consuming any other application. The cases v nn < 0 and v nn > 0 correspond to applications being substitutes and complements, respectively. If v nn < 0, we have
, and applications detract from each other.
The reverse is true for complements. Without loss of generality, let h(0) = 0.
Consumers are ordered according to cost so that
Each developer may produce one application. Developer j's profits are
where m is the measure of users, c(j) is a developer-specific development cost, σ is 
Monopoly platforms
In this section, we study access and investment incentives in proprietary and open platforms in isolation from each other and compare equilibrium outcomes.
We begin by characterizing the socially optimal allocation.
3.1. First best. The social planner chooses m, n, and x to maximize the sum of indirect utility and profits: Since developers cannot invest in platform quality, equations (1) and (2) become
In the third stage, developers choose the price of applications. Let ρ * (j) be the third-stage equilibrium price of application j. Price is determined differently when applications are substitutes and complements.
When applications are substitutes, the largest price an application developer may charge is v n (if the price of any application was greater than the marginal value of the last application, users would be better off not consuming that application), which means that application prices are ρ * (j) = v n for all j.
When applications are complements, the equilibrium price is no longer v n . To see this, note that if price was v n , the total cost of a bundle of n applications would be larger than its gross utility to users (n v n > v(n, x) − v(0, x)), and thus users would be better off not buying any application. In equilibrium, we must
developer may increase the price of its application without affecting user demand.
Thus, in equilibrium
be the average contribution of applications to consumer utility, and note that w(n, x)
is increasing in n and x. In a symmetric equilibrium, all developers charge the same price, and application prices are ρ * (j) = w for all j.
In the second stage, users and developers choose whether to access the platform.
The marginal entrants, m and n, satisfy v(n, x) − n ρ * = h(m) + p u , and m ρ * = c(n) + p d . From here, we obtain the inverse demand functions:
Since ρ * does not depend on m, ∂ p u /∂ m = −h m < 0 for substitutes and complements. With substitutes, ∂ p d /∂ n = m v nn − c n , which is always negative.
With complements, ∂ p d /∂ n = m w n − c n , which is negative only if n c n > m (v n − w). We assume this condition holds.
In the first stage, the platform provider chooses x, p u , and p d to maximize
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium. 
The marginal user and developer obtain zero utility and profit in equilibrium.
Therefore, the net utility of user i < m in equilibrium is u(i) = h(m) − h(i), and the profit of developer j < n is π(j) = c(n) − c(j).
The condition determining x in the proprietary platform is the same as that of the first best. Therefore, if m and n were set at their socially optimal levels, investment would be optimal. A proprietary platform sets access prices in order to capture the full increase in user surplus due to an increase in x, and thus has strong incentives to invest in product quality.
However, the conditions determining m and n are different from those of the first best, which means that x will be set at an inefficient level. Efficiency requires that the value of the platform is equal to the entry cost of the marginal user (v = h), and that the marginal benefit of the marginal application is equal to the entry cost of the marginal developer, (m v n = c). The platform provider does not fully internalize the marginal benefits of increases in m and n, and thus sets prices that lead to insufficient entry.
Turning to the analysis of prices, we see that the platform provider may choose to subsidize users when the price of applications is high, but that she will never subsidize developers (recall that n c n > m (v n − w) when applications are complements). (1) and (2) become:
In open platforms, payments between users and developers affect the incentives to join the platform and to invest in platform quality. Because application prices are determined differently when they are substitutes and complements, we study both cases separately. Proposition 2 summarizes the equilibrium choices of users and developers when applications are substitutes.
Proposition 2 (Open platform with substitute applications). An equilibrium exists. The measure of users and developers and the investment in platform quality (m, n, x) satisfy h = v − n v n , c = m v n , and m v nx = σ. Application prices are
In the case of open platforms, there may exist multiple equilibria. We will focus our analysis on the equilibrium with higher platform investment.
In equilibrium, users obtain u(i) = h(m) − h(i), and developers earn π(j) = c(n) − c(j) − σ x(j). Because h i > 0 and c j > 0, larger equilibrium entry by users or developers implies more user utility and developer profit.
A given level of equilibrium aggregate investment, x, may result from different distributions of individual developer investments, x(j). As long as m v nx > σ, any developer will find it optimal to increase its investment in platform quality. In equilibrium, m v nx = σ regardless of who is investing. developer j will find it optimal to enter the platform. Thus, there will be entry until m v n = c, and the marginal developer will not invest in platform quality.
The condition determining developer access is the same as that of the first best. However, the equilibrium is inefficient for two reasons. First, user access is suboptimal because applications are priced above their marginal cost. The total mark-up paid by users is n v n . Second, developer incentives to invest are not socially optimal because developers do not fully internalize the effect of an increase in x on user utility.
We turn now to the case of complement applications. Proposition 3 summarizes the equilibrium choices of users and developers. We begin by comparing the incentives for user access. In a proprietary platform, the platform provider internalizes the effect of monetary payments from users to developers, and chooses access prices to neutralize it. Thus, user access depends only on the extensive margin of demand. In an open platform, users do not have to pay an access price but they have to pay application prices, which depend on the marginal or average contribution of an additional application to user utility.
Thus, user access depends only on the intensive margin of demand.
Substitutes Complements
Welfare optimum in an open platform is lower than in a proprietary platform. In the case of complements, this follows from w x < v x , which always holds. In the case of substitutes, even though v nx could be larger than v x from a mathematical point of view, it is only reasonable to assume that v nx < v x . To understand why, note that if the model had a discrete number of developers, v nx would be defined as
, which is always smaller than v x (n, x). In Section 3.5, we illustrate this result with the help of an example. Finally, let h(i) = i, c(j) = j, and σ = 1.
Using the equations in Figure 1 , we derive equilibrium adoption and investment.
The social planner's solution is
For the proprietary platform, the equations are
Finally, for the open platform, we have
Due to the non-linearity of the equilibrium equations, it is not possible to find an explicit solution for the parameter values that lead to x o > x p . Figure In a proprietary platform with closed access, investment incentives are strong because the platform provider can internalize indirect network effects between the two groups, and adjust access prices accordingly. Thus, the platform provider appropriates the contribution of investment to users' gross utility, v x , which means that investment would be socially optimal if m and n were set at their first-best levels. With open access, the platform provider cannot internalize network effects, and thereby benefits only partially from her investment in platform quality. Thus, investment incentives would be suboptimal even if m and n were set at their firstbest levels.
As for access incentives, giving open access to developers improves their direct incentives to join the platform, but has a direct negative effect on user access and investment. Given that developers' revenues depend on user demand, which in turn depends on the investment in the platform, a one-sided open-access policy may reduce the number of developers in equilibrium.
Mixed Duopoly
In Developers multi-home. Thus we assume that it is inexpensive to adapt applications to run on both platforms. Even though the measure of applications is the same for both platforms, equilibrium application prices may differ across platforms because they depend on platform quality investments.
The timing is as follows: (i) 
and the optimal investment in the open platform by developers is (7) (
In the first stage, the platform provider chooses p u , p d , and x p to maximize profits, taking into account that the second-stage equilibrium levels of m, n, and
, and x p . Proposition 6 characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 6 (Mixed duopoly). An equilibrium exists and is unique. The measure of users and developers and investments in platform quality (m, n, 
Proposition 6 
Allowing for changes in x o , we have
The new terms in the price equations measure the indirect effect of changes in m and n on profits as they operate through x o . To see this, note that the effect of a change in x o on the revenues of the proprietary firm is
and the effects of changes in m and n on x o are
Thus In order to focus our analysis on the incentives for platform investment, we have made several simplifying assumptions, such as not considering direct network effects among users, restricting heterogeneity to adoption costs for users and development costs for developers, and abstracting from design conflicts in open-source development. Extending the model to allow for direct network effects, heterogeneity in user valuations, and code forking present interesting directions for further research.
Appendix: Proofs of propositions in text
Proof of Proposition 1. There is a unique pair of prices p u , p d for each pair m, n, so finding the optimal m and n is equivalent to finding the optimal p u and p d . Replacing prices by inverse demand functions in the profit function we obtain
Rearranging terms, profits can be
The first-order conditions with respect to (m, n, x) are v = h + m h m , m v n = c + n c n and m v x = σ. Assuming h mm and c nn are positive, or negative but not too large in absolute value, the second-order conditions will hold, and there will be at least one local maximum. If there is more than one local maximum, the firm will choose the one with the largest profit (i.e., the global maximum).
Substituting the first two expressions in the inverse demand functions, we obtain the optimal access prices. There is a unique pair (p u , p d ) for a given triple (m, n, x).
Finally, even though in the second stage users and developers may coordinate in different second-stage equilibria for a given pair of access prices (i.e., there may be more than one pair m, n solving v = h + m h m and m v n = c + n c n ), only one combination m, n will be part of the Nash equilibrium of the complete game (the one corresponding to the optimal prices p u , p d ), which is a condition for subgame perfect equilibrium. Thus, the equilibrium is unique.
Proof of Proposition 2. By the arguments brought forward in Section 3.2, application price is v n . In the first stage, users and developers choose whether to enter the platform, and developers choose how much to invest in platform quality.
In choosing how much to invest, developers solve max
The first-order conditions yield m v nx = σ. The marginal user and developer obtain zero utility and profit. The marginal agents do not invest in platform innovation. Therefore, in equilibrium we must have v − n v n − h(m) = 0, and
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof follows similar steps as the proof of Proposition 2, taking into account that the price of applications is now w. Proof of Proposition 5. When applications are substitutes, the measure of users and developers is determined by x and p u through the equations p u = v − n v n − h, and 0 = m v n − c. Using the implicit function theorem, we obtain the following derivatives:
The platform provider chooses p u and x in order to maximize p u m(p u , x) − σ x. Introducing the derivatives obtained above in the first-order conditions, we obtain the results stated in the proposition. The proof for the complementary applications case is analogous.
Proof of Proposition 6. Existence and uniqueness follow from similar arguments than those of Proposition 1. The first-order conditions are m + p u dm dp u + p d dn dp u = 0, p u dm dp d + n + p d dn dp We will show how to obtain dm dp u (the other derivatives are obtained similarly). The total differentials of equations (5), (6) and (7) dx o dp u , 0 = −v o nx dm dp u + (1 − m) v o nnx dn dp u + (1 − m) v o nxx dx o dp u , which constitute a system of three equations with three unknowns. Solving for dm/dp u , we obtain dm dp u = (1 − m) v Introducing the derivatives in the first-order conditions for the proprietary plat- 4 More generally, our model applies to any technology platform allowing the interaction between sellers and buyers.
5 The assumption of a continuum of users and developers is made for easiness of exposition. Our results directly translate to a model with a discrete number of users or developers.
6 Function h may also be interpreted as a taste-differentiation parameter or transportation cost. where α z(x(j)) is the standalone contribution to utility of application j, with α ≥ 0, z x > 0, and z xx < 0. Finally, suppose that the investment cost of developer j is σ(j) and that σ j > 0. In equilibrium, application prices are v n + α z(x(j)), which means that α z(x(j)) represents the private benefit of investment for developer j (see Llanes and de Elejalde, 2013 general results on incentives to invest. Unfortunately, however, we cannot make precise comparisons of welfare and profits without assuming specific functional forms.
